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ABSTRACT
Eritrea gained independence in 1993 in the post-Cold War context of changing regional 
political alliances. From the beginning Eritrea‘s relationship with Ethiopia was strained, 
and following the Eritrean-Ethiopian war (1998-2000) Asmara encountered increasing 
isolation in the international arena. 
This paper focuses on aspects of Eritrea’s contemporary political history in the sub-
regional context. It highlights Asmara’s sour relations with some of its powerful neighbors, 
which have been integrally linked to Eritrea being increasingly portrayed as a regionally 
destabilizing and terrorism-supporting rogue state. It is therefore argued here that 
although Eritrea‘s tactics in its foreign affairs have hardly differed from those of other 
states in the Horn of Africa, the prevailing political realities in the sub-region have resulted 
in the strategic image of Eritrea as a threat to regional peace and stability. 
Keywords: Eritrea; Horn of Africa; foreign relations; rogue state
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INTRODUCTION
In 1993, following almost 30 years of war, Eritrea obtained independence. However, 
the initial hope for Eritrea setting an unprecedented example for democratic 
governance and political order in the Horn of Africa sub-region, where authoritarian 
regimes are prevalent, soon withered away. Instead, it became clear that the 
exercise of political power in Eritrea took an authoritarian form, emanating from 
the political order of the liberation movement mainly dictated by the Eritrean 
People’s Liberation Front (EPLF). The legacy of the “liberation struggle” came to 
occupy a central role in the Eritrean post-conflict state and nation-building, with 
authoritarian and repressive governance characterizing its political culture and 
system today.
Similarly, Eritrea’s foreign relations were oriented to support the domestic status 
quo.1 From the beginning, they drew from an increasing confrontation with Ethiopia 
to justify the prevailing domestic authoritarian order. Eritrean government’s foreign 
policy has also been used to counter Ethiopian influence in the sub-region, to which 
the United States, China, and other powerful partners have contributed. Through 
its foreign relations, Eritrea has unsuccessfully sought to promote alternative sub-
regional order that has brought it into confrontation with a number of its neighbors 
and their allies.
It is therefore safe to say that Eritrea has played an important role in the 
contemporary sub-regional politics of the Horn of Africa. Having already developed 
vibrant diaspora representation during the liberation war, independence allowed 
Eritrea to further extend its influence. Yet, Eritrea’s poor relations with Ethiopia 
deteriorated and provoked the 1998-2000 war. The Eritrean-Ethiopian conflict has 
been largely seen as a consequence of Asmara’s policy, and most Western states 
have sided with Ethiopia. This alignment has developed into a wider consideration 
of Ethiopia as a stabilizer in the otherwise volatile sub-region where Eritrea has 
been deemed to approximate a status of a rogue state,2 Sudan has undergone 
protracted war, and the collapse of state authority in Somalia has been seen as a 
source of armed violence, terrorism, and regional instability. 
Since the Eritrean-Ethiopian war, an image of Eritrea as a destabilizing threat to the 
externally promoted “peace and order” in the Horn of Africa has emerged. But Eritrea 
has been perceived a threat to regional security not only due to its confrontation 
with Ethiopia. It has been considered to support opposition parties, armed groups, 
and “terrorist” activities in order to destabilize its neighboring states, including 
providing arms to al-Shabaab Islamists in Somalia. Ethiopia exerting its influence 
and Western organizations condemning Eritrea for human rights violations, among 
other things, has further buttressed Eritrea’s negative international image. Yet, 
1 On Eritrea’s foreign relations, see e.g. Reid, Richard (ed.) (2009) Eritrea’s External Relations: Understanding Its 
Regional Role and Foreign Policy (London : Chatham House).
2 Eritrea is largely seen as an authoritarian state with poor human rights record, which supports “terrorism” and 
constitutes a limited threat to international “peace”. Although Eritrea has not expressed aspirations to acquire 
weapons of mass destruction, it has often been referred to as Africa’s North Korea. It can be said to qualify 
somewhere between a pariah (an outcast of the international community but not considered a serious threat 
beyond its borders) and a rogue (seeking weapons of mass destruction and constituting a threat to world 
peace). See e.g. Myers, Nathanael (2010) “Africa’s North Korea: inside Eritrea’s Open-Air Prison”, Foreign Policy, 
15 June. Online at: http://foreignpolicy.com/2010/06/15/africas-north-korea/
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unsurprisingly, Eritrea’s foreign policy, and to some degree its domestic politics, is 
not much different from that practiced by its Western-allied neighbors in the Horn 
of Africa’s “bad neighborhood”. In addition, being a small and somewhat poor state 
in comparison with most of its neighbors, Eritrea’s capacity to stage major instability 
in the Horn is limited. 
This paper explains major contours of Eritrea’s historical trajectory and its role in 
the sub-regional political context. It shows how the deterioration of relations with 
Ethiopia, and the latter’s deepening connections with internationally powerful 
partners, was integrally linked to Eritrea being increasingly portrayed as a regionally 
destabilizing and “terrorism-supporting rogue state”. Eritrea being singled out for 
supporting armed groups that are seen to hinder a Western-imposed solution in 
Somalia also led to deterioration of its relations with other states in the sub-region 
and undermined its overall international position. It is therefore argued here that 
the strategic image of Eritrea as a menace to regional peace and stability follows the 
external powers’, Ethiopia’s, and its regional allies’ interests.
BACKGROUND: FROM COLONY TO INDEPENDENCE
During the late 19th century, Eritrea constituted the northernmost territory of 
Ethiopian empire’s sphere of influence on the African continent. In the course of 
the early 1880s Eritrea was colonized by Italy, which by 1890 had formalized its 
dominion. In 1936 Eritrea became one of the constitutive parts of Italian East Africa, 
which also included Ethiopia (1936-1941) and British Somaliland (1940-1941). 
However, after Italy’s defeat in World War II, Eritrea became a British protectorate 
until it was federated as part of Ethiopia in 1952. 
Following the federal arrangement, Ethiopia sought to consolidate its hold on 
Eritrea. As a federal part of Ethiopia, Eritrea was to maintain a degree of regional 
autonomy, including major symbols and institutions of statehood.3 However, it soon 
became clear that imperial Ethiopia under Emperor Haile Selassie, itself a polity in 
which power was centralized through repressive governance and restrictions of civil 
liberties, would not respect the federal arrangement.4 Protest letters addressed to 
the Emperor and the United Nations received no serious response,5 and in May 
1954 Eritrean Legislative Assembly passed a resolution that denounced Ethiopian 
domination.6
3 Eritrea was given the right to its own flag, administrative and judicial structure, police, local administration, 
as well as exercise control over its domestic affairs, including taxation. See e.g. Habte Selassie, Bereket (1989) 
Eritrea and the United Nations and Other Essays (Trenton, NJ: Red Sea Press). 
4 Emperor Selassie appointing his son-in-law, Andergatchew Messai, as the crown’s representative in Eritrea, 
with extensive political power, symbolized to many the great extent of Ethiopian domination. Andergatchew 
took over as a supreme administrator and worked actively to undermine Eritrea’s federal status by using the 
Chief Executive of the Eritrean Legislative Assembly, Ato Tedla Bairu, to terrorize local leaders and to implement 
repressive measures that often violated the Eritrean constitution. See e.g. Connell, Dan and Killion, Tom (2011) 
Historical Dictionary of Eritrea (2nd edition, Plymouth: Scarecrow), pp. 70-71.
5 This paragraph draws heavily from “Eritrea: General Facts, 1989”, http://www.qsl.net/eritrea/facts.htm, and 
“Fact and Evidence Part II: [1952-1962] The Consequent Disunity of Political Leaders”, Eritrea Human Rights 
Electronic Archive, http://www.ehrea.org/1952.php.
6 Bimbi, Guido (1982) “The National Liberation Struggle and the Liberation Fronts”. In The Eritrean Case, edited by 
Research and Information Centre on Eritrea, Rome: RICE, pp. 167-206.
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The continuation of repression orchestrated by Ethiopia led to growing political 
conflict in Eritrea. In 1955, Haile Selassie eventually replaced the Eritrean political 
leadership in an attempt to extend control and preparation to end Eritrea’s federal 
status. The following year students demonstrated,7 which caused further repression. 
In 1957, a campaign was initiated to impose Amharic as Eritrea’s official language by 
burning Tigrinyan and Arabic books, and the year after Ethiopian flag was established 
as the official symbol of Eritrea.8 By this time, the authorities violently coerced a 
number of legislators opposing union with Ethiopia, and many of the numerous 
pro-unionist Eritreans began realigning with those aiming to secure Eritrean 
political rights, causing demonstrations that were violently suppressed. Hundreds 
died and were injured, and thousands imprisoned.9 Finally, by 1959 Ethiopia had 
assumed administrative and judicial control of Eritrea by a mix of coercive and co-
optive measures, which led the Eritrean Legislative Assembly to change the name 
of Eritrean government to “Eritrean Administration”, while Ethiopia took charge of 
Eritrean school system.10
At this stage, the non-violent struggle gave way to those advocating liberation of 
Eritrea by violent means. In November 1958 the Eritrean Liberation Movement 
(ELM) had been established in Port Sudan, and in 1960 it held a founding conference 
in Asmara while maintaining exile representation in Cairo. Around the same time 
however, some Muslim hardliners, seeking independence from Ethiopia through an 
armed struggle, founded the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) in Cairo. The ELF was a 
Muslim organization, and by using religious and ethnic agitation its leaders sought 
it to become the sole liberation movement in Eritrea. The ELF leadership deemed 
the attempt to eradicate the ELM as necessary for unifying the armed struggle that 
could have only one true representative,11 and its military efforts to eliminate ELM 
were the first manifestation of bloody religious, sectional, and regional rivalries that 
set the stage for further violence between liberation groups and factions during 
the war.12 In September 1961, the ELF initiated an armed struggle, targeting the 
ELM, its ethnic constituencies, and Ethiopian security forces.13 In response, the ELM 
also sought to wage armed resistance, but Ethiopian security forces suppressed 
the attempt14 and a number of its members were eventually co-opted in the ELF’s 
military organization.15 In order to counter the rising Eritrean armed opposition, on 
14 November 1962 Ethiopia finalized the annexation of Eritrea. It had put pressure 
on the Eritrean legislative body to accept the end of the federal arrangement, 
7 See e.g. “Reflections on the Eritrean People Struggle for Independence [sic.]”, Eritrea Human Rights Electronic 
Archive, http://www.ehrea.org/19591.php, and Gebre-Medhin, Jordan (1989) Peasants and Nationalism in 
Eritrea (Trenton: Red Sea Press), p. 171.
8 Yohannes, Ogbazghi (1993) “Eritrea: A Country in Transition”, Review of African Political Economy 57, July, pp. 
7-28.
9 “Reflections on the Eritrean People Struggle”, http://www.ehrea.org/19591.php.
10 “Fact and Evidence Part II”, http://www.ehrea.org/1952.php, and “Reflections on the Eritrean People Struggle”, 
http://www.ehrea.org/19591.php.
11Iyob, Ruth (1995) The Eritrean Struggle for Independence: Domination, Resistance, Nationalism 1941-1993, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 112, and Bereketeab, Eritrea, p. 184.
12 Bereketeab, Eritrea, p. 185.
13 Idris Mohammed Adam, Idris Osman Geladewos, and Osman Saleh Sabbe led the ELF military effort from 
Cairo, claiming exclusive ownership of the Eritrean cause and portraying ELM’s secular and ethnically inclusive 
stand as communist and against religion.
14 Mengisteab, Kidane and Yohannes, Ogbazghi (2005) Anatomy of an African Tragedy: Political, Economic, and 
Foreign Policy Crisis in Post-Independence Eritrea (Trenton, NJ: Red Sea Press), p. 41, and Negash, Tekeste (2005) 
Eritrea and Ethiopia: The Federal Experience (2nd edition, Uppsala: Nordic Africa Institute), p. 138.
15 Sherman, Richard (1980) Eritrea: The Unfinished Revolution (New York: Praeger), p. 42.
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dissolved the Eritrean government, and declared Eritrea an Ethiopian province. This 
fueled Eritrean resistance and efforts to strengthen armed opposition.
The military effort to liberate Eritrea in the early 1960s became largely possible 
due to external support. The exile representation of the Eritrean opposition 
was successful in attracting foreign assistance largely by exploiting the Cold War 
competition between the United States and the Soviet Union, aspirations by 
powerful states in the sub-region, and rivalries between the neighboring states. In 
the early 1960s, the United States’ presence in the Horn of Africa was still unrivaled 
by the Soviet Union. However, by late 1960s, pan-Arabism had consumed the 
Soviet allies Egypt, Iraq, and Syria, and pan-Somalism was dictating the aspirations 
of another Soviet ally, Somalia. A common aspiration was to curb Ethiopia’s and 
the United States’ influence. Supporting the Eritrean cause therefore became an 
opportunity to advance towards this objective. The aid from the revolutionary Arab 
states, including Libya after 1969, as well as Soviet Union, China, and North Korea, 
enabled a sustained armed struggle in Eritrea. On the other side, the United States 
and its allies continued to back Ethiopia.16
By 1970, the incoherencies within ELF had led to a factional confrontation. This 
favored Isaias Afewerki and Ramadan Mohamed Nur, who had received training 
in China and Cuba, and allowed them to establish independent external support 
networks for their guerrilla constituencies. Relying on authoritarian strategies and an 
established constituency of largely Muslim lowlanders, Afewerki now commanded 
an independent force called the EPLF, founded in 1974, which allowed him to 
weaken potential rival leaders by using their religious and regional differences to his 
advantage. The use of violence and terror (allegedly murders, questionable trials, 
and executions) served EPLF’s consolidation, and eventually enabled Afewerki to 
claim supreme leadership of the liberation movement. 
The same year in Addis Ababa Ethiopian junior left-wing army officers overthrew 
Emperor Haile Selassie. They established a socialist regime under the supreme 
leadership of Mengistu Haile Mariam, which had far-reaching consequences 
because Ethiopia began drifting towards the Soviet bloc causing a domino effect 
of shifting alliances in the sub-region. It also opened more space for Eritrean 
opposition. As a result, “By the mid-1974,  [the Eritrean armed opposition] was 
firmly based in eastern Sahel and along the Red Sea coast and began to move to 
the Christian highlands, where its social revolutionary political program attracted 
the support of many young people and peasants”.17 Two years after, in the Red Sea 
Province alone, there were 25,000-30,000 guerrilla fighters controlling most of the 
territory but facing 20,000 Ethiopian army troops.18
Afewerki’s EPLF continued the already established practice of organizing liberation 
groups by coercive violence under highly centralized leadership. The regional and 
religious differences under the military command ran deep, which favored the 
16 In 1964, the United States sent a counterinsurgency team to Ethiopia. Keller, Edmund (1994) “The United 
States, Ethiopia, and Eritrean Independence.” In Amare Tekle, ed., Eritrea and Ethiopia: From Conflict to 
Cooperation (Lawrenceville, NJ: The Red Sea Press), p. 172.
17 Connell and Killion, Historical Dictionary of Eritrea, p. 224.
18 Connell, Dan (2003) Taking on the Superpowers: Collected Articles on the Eritrean Revolution (1976-1983), Vol. 1 
(Trenton NJ: The Red Sea Press), p. 31.
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maintaining of intra-organizational repression and violence as methods to keep 
reformist sections and dissenters at bay. The EPLF relied heavily on diaspora resources 
and sought to build national unity through violence, political indoctrination and 
mobilization. This buttressed Afewerki’s sole control of the ideological and political 
agenda and his supreme leadership position. During the latter stages of the war, 
EPLF effectively administered the territory under its control with meager resources. 
Thus, the authoritarian and repressive nature of the movement, ostensibly 
necessary for survival, was deeply ingrained in the EPLF’s political culture by the 
time Eritrea obtained its independence,19 along with the ability to survive without 
extensive dependence on external resources and relations with third parties.
In May 1991, Ethiopia’s socialist Derg regime was overthrown by the Ethiopian 
People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) umbrella of opposition forces. 
The Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) had assumed the prominent role in the 
EPRDF because it was the strongest military organization in the Ethiopia proper. 
After the Derg’s downfall, Ethiopia entered into a period of uncertainty during which 
TPLF ceased the opportunity to take over de facto administration of the country.
Eventually, it was the combination of Ethiopian and international politics which 
decided the faith of Eritrea. During the war against the Derg Eritrean support 
for TPLF had at times been instrumental, and the latter had promised Eritreans 
independence upon Mengistu’s downfall.20 However, in the context of post-Derg 
Ethiopia in which TPLF sought to control the state, it was mainly the EPLF’s strength, 
and perhaps to a lesser degree TPLF’s earlier promise, which persuaded the latter 
to respect its commitment to the Eritrean opposition. This is because EPLF had a 
large, committed, and battle-hardened army which TPLF was unwilling to confront 
and unable to defeat. In addition, any showdown with EPLF would have weakened 
TPLF and threatened its rule in Addis Ababa. Although TPLF’s other allies were 
militarily substantially weaker, TPLF’s armed confrontation with EPLF would have 
undermined its relative strength and the ability to fend off a possible claim on the 
central authority in Ethiopia by the other EPRDF or non-EPRDF groups.  
Second, the EPLF enjoyed international support. The United States had assisted it 
against the Ethiopian socialist regime, and Western states generally viewed EPLF in 
positive light. Having been victorious against the Derg, Eritrea was seen as deserving 
of independence. The expectation was, to an extent, that independent Eritrea 
arising from the ashes of repressive Ethiopian socialist regime would become an 
exemplary democratic state and a Western ally, bringing new hope to the sub-
region largely plagued by authoritarian rule and instability. The United States, a key 
player, was above all preoccupied by the continuation of endemic war and regional 
instability if Eritreans were denied separation from Ethiopia, and therefore backed 
Eritrean self-determination referendum vigorously.
19 The Eritrean Human Rights Electronic Archive estimates that the liberation movement eliminated 3,000-5,000 
of its own fighters in 1973-1991. See more at http://www.ehrea.org/whoaret.php. 
20 However, relations between EPLF and TPLF had already been conflictive during the armed struggle, especially 
in the mid-1980 when the EPLF cut off the supply lines of the TPLF in the north. The divergences were mainly 
based on military strategy and ideology (conceptions of imperialism and secessionism). See Young, John 
(1996) “The Tigray and Eritrean Peoples Liberation Fronts: A History of Tensions and Pragmatism”, The Journal of 
Modern African Studies, 34, 1, pp. 105-120.
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Following the Derg’s downfall, the Ethiopian revolutionary forces established a 
provisional government. This was heavily influenced by the United States. In May 
1991, a conference was held in London in which TPLF leadership recognized EPLF 
to have been victorious against the Derg, and reluctantly agreed to the Eritrean 
referendum for self-determination that would likely lead to its independence.21 
In July, another conference, presided by the interim government Chairman and 
TPLF leader Meles Zenawi, was held to establish the Transitional Government of 
Ethiopia. The TPLF then reaffirmed its commitment to the Eritrean referendum 
within two years, while Eritreans promised that the port of Assab would remain 
open for Ethiopians to maintain access to the sea.22 Although initially both TPLF and 
EPLF showed interest in working together in defense, economy, and to ensure free 
movement of people between Ethiopia and Eritrea, the EPLF began preparations 
for separating Eritrea from Ethiopia by establishing border checkpoints, denying 
entry of diplomats and journalists, and expelling non-Eritreans.23 Finally, during 23-
25 April 1993, the self-determination referendum took place and 99.83% of the 
voters (with 98.52% turnout) decided that Eritrea should become independent. On 
27 April, Eritrea declared independence which Ethiopia subsequently recognized.
FROM A BEACON OF HOPE TO THE SUB-REGION’S MENACE
Already before independence Afewerki’s EPLF claimed state power in Eritrea. 
Soon after, in a move that mirrored TPLF’s efforts in Ethiopia, EPLF began curbing 
opposition and civil liberties in an attempt to consolidate its exclusive command of 
the political system. The long war and related divisions had left a legacy of suspicion 
and mistrust, which the leadership’s emphasis on common national identity sought 
to remedy. The EPLF made an effort to portray the Eritrean political system as 
democratic and inclusive. As part of this attempt, in 1994 it changed its name to 
People’s Front for Democracy and Justice (PFDJ), passed a National Charter, “ . . . 
and resolved to become a broad-based political movement, distinct and separate 
from the state, open to all nationalist Eritreans regardless of social class and political 
convictions”.24 On 23 May 1997 Eritrean constitution was ratified, and its Article 7 
called “Democratic principles” promised citizens “broad and active participation in 
all political, economic, social, and cultural life of the country”. However, drafted 
as essentially democratic document,25 it hardly corresponded with the prevailing 
political reality emanating from the authoritarian and violent order of the liberation 
struggle. Arguably, this is one of the main reasons why the constitution has not 
been implemented.
No change followed in the leadership and the executive political structures. Afewerki, 
Secretary General of EPLF and the state’s President, became the Chairman of PFDJ, 
while the EPLF high command structures were converted into government councils 
21 In a famous interview with American scholar Paul Henze, TPLF leader Meles Zenawi openly expressed his 
interest in federating Eritrea as part of Ethiopia and reluctance of the survival of independent Eritrea due to 
deep religious divisions that would flare up when the common enemy (Derg) is gone. See Henze, Paul B. (1990) 
Conversations with Meles Zenawi, J3 26/002/92/3, 31 March / 1 April.
22 Perlez, Jane (1991) “Talks on a New Ethiopia Affirm Right to Secede”, The New York Times, 4 July.
23 Farkas, Evelyn (2003) Fractured States and U.S. Foreign Policy: Iraq, Ethiopia, and Bosnia in the 1990s (Basingstoke: 
Palgrave MacMillan), p. 52.
24 Markakis, John (1995) “Eritrea’s National Charter”, Review of African Political Economy 22, 63, p. 126.
25 The Constitution of Eritrea (1997).
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without significant changes. From the beginning, the PFDJ, a hierarchical and highly 
centralized organization, controlled the main legislative body, the National Assembly, 
occupying half of its seats, and although judiciary was founded as a separate body 
the President appointed, and exerted influence over, its leading members. Yet, it is 
the informal institutions and networks, such as the President’s group of advisors 
that functions in parallel with the Council of Ministers, the PFDJ Secretariat, and the 
high-level army officials who report directly to the Presidency, which give President 
Afewerki supreme power and extensive control over the state’s political, legislative, 
and judicial institutions.26
Ideologically, from the outset, the Eritrean state implemented developmental model 
based on the expectation of individuals’ self-sacrifice for greater good of the society 
and the state. The state and the community were put ahead of individual political 
rights and economic aspirations. The expected sacrifice by each individual was to 
be made through the National Service; by defending the country and engaging in 
low-pay physical work. Alternatively, if the individual decided to leave the country, 
the expectation was that he or she contributes financially from the diaspora. The 
polemic obligatory diaspora tax and fees to deal with Eritrean administration when 
abroad were put in place to exert a degree of control and to ensure a flow of funding 
to the state. The underlying logic has it that when more Eritreans emigrate, more 
government revenue from abroad is generated.
From early on, the government sought to divert attention from Eritrea’s internal 
dilemmas while consolidating the one-party system. It therefore shifted focus to 
foreign relations with an attempt to secure an influential position in the sub-regional 
politics that would facilitate managing its internal order. During the early days of 
independence, the Sudanese government’s effort to extend political Islam to the 
neighboring states gave Eritrea an opportunity to shift attention from its internal 
politics to external affairs. Sudan’s attempts to back Islamist forces to gain foothold 
in Eritrea failed, however, and Asmara broke relations with its neighbor in December 
1994. Around this time, in retaliation to Khartoum’s continued support of Muslim 
and Islamic armed opposition, Asmara began assisting elements of the Sudanese 
opposition that sought to overthrow the Sudanese government. As previously 
during the liberation war, the sanctuaries in the neighboring state, and ethnic 
linkages largely of pastoralist people crossing the porous Sudan-Eritrea border, 
facilitated supporting guerrillas on both sides. However, now for the first time as an 
independent state, Eritrea was able to assist rebels in Sudan and received funding 
from the United States to this end. In the course of 1996-7 the Sudanese opposition 
umbrella, National Democratic Alliance, backed by Uganda, Ethiopia, Eritrea, and 
the United States among others, made significant military gains and threatened the 
very existence of the government in Khartoum. Although this forced the regime to 
make some concessions to the rebels, it survived. The most acute military pressure 
on the Khartoum government subsided when Eritrea’s confrontation with Ethiopia 
led to the war between the two states in 1998. 
Meanwhile, Eritrea’s relations with Yemen were severed because of a dispute 
over the Hanish Islands. Asmara claimed ownership of the archipelago located 
strategically in the narrowing southern stretch of the Red Sea leading to the Gulf of 
26 Connell, Dan (2011) “Countries at Crossroads 2011: Eritrea”, Freedom House, p. 2-3.
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Aden, and in 1996 attacked Yemeni soldiers on the Greater Hanish Island. Yemen was 
reluctant to withdraw, and the countries fought a brief war. Eventually, however, the 
parties referred the situation to the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA), which in 
its October 1998 award gave the ownership of the main islands of the archipelago 
to Yemen. Despite having suffered a legal defeat, being already at war with Ethiopia 
since May prevented Eritrea from pursuing the confrontation with Yemen further. 
Both parties accepted the arbitration decision.
During the early years of independence, Eritrea’s relationship with Ethiopia had 
deteriorated rapidly. Although a number of cooperation treaties had been initially 
signed, and EPLF and TPLF had already in 1991 agreed to set up a commission 
to inquire on any disputes that could emerge from Eritrea’s likely independence, 
these failed to prevent the rising antagonism. It appears that at this stage Eritrean 
leadership became increasingly preoccupied by Ethiopian influence over its economy 
which it sought to minimize by introducing its own currency. However, Addis Ababa 
took this as a threat to Ethiopia’s interests, and pressure grew along the partially 
ambiguously demarcated border between the two countries. As both states focused 
their attention increasingly on the border, a series of violent incidents took place 
that were triggered by Ethiopians shooting and killing eight Eritrean soldiers on 6 
May 1998.27 Eritrean military occupied a disputed village of Badme on 12 May, and 
the following day Ethiopia accused Eritrea of aggression and declared war.28 On 14 
May, Ethiopian government told the United Nations Security Council that Eritrea 
had violated its territorial integrity. While some have alleged that already in 1996-
7 Ethiopia had initiated an orchestrated campaign to harass local inhabitants and 
to move the border further into Eritrea,29 others have considered the war to have 
resulted from Eritrean leadership’s attempt to bolster its image and strengthen its 
position relative to Ethiopia.30 Having instigated the war or not, Eritrean attempt 
was clearly to defy Ethiopia’s increasing domination in the sub-region, and shift 
focus from the repressive internal politics to foreign affairs. 
The eruption of war between the former allies had an effect on their neighboring 
states. Eritrea’s relations with Djibouti deteriorated rapidly, as Djibouti sided with 
Ethiopia that desperately needed a sea access after losing the route through the 
Eritrean port of Assab. In 1996 Eritrea and Djibouti had already almost gone to 
war over the poorly demarcated and disputed border in Ras Doumeira area, and in 
November 1998 Djibouti broke relations with Eritrea in solidarity with Ethiopia. By 
doing this, it capitalized on the opportunity to gain economic benefit and political 
goodwill from becoming Ethiopia’s main port. The relations between Eritrea and 
Djibouti continued being contentious after the Eritrea-Ethiopia war, and marred 
by the United States, Djibouti’s major ally, which increasingly considered Eritrea 
as a source of instability in the sub-region. Djibouti, hosting the main American 
military base in Sub-Saharan Africa, and a French base, continued to side with 
Ethiopian and Western interests. This led to further deterioration of Djibouti-Eritrea 
27 Reports of International Arbitral Awards (2005) “Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission – Partial Award: Jus Ad 
Bellum – Ethiopia’s Claims 1-8”, 19 December, pp. 464-465.
28 Giorgis, Andebrhan Welde (2014) Eritrea at a Crossroads: A Narrative of Triumph, Betrayal and Hope (Houston, 
TX: Strategic Book Publishing), p. 516.
29 Tesfai, Alemseged (no date) “The Cause of the Eritrean-Ethiopia Border Conflict”, http://www.dehai.org/
conflict/analysis/alemsghed3.html
30 Abbink, Jon (2003) “Badme and the Ethio-Eritrean Border: The Challenge of Demarcation in the Post-War 
Period”, Africa: rivista trimestrale di studi e documentazione, 58 (1-4), pp. 221, 226.
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relations, partly because of accusations of Eritrea supporting rebel groups in the 
neighboring states.31 In June 2008 the situation culminated in a brief border conflict 
in Ras Doumeira after Djibouti accused Eritrea of territorial encroachment.32 The 
confrontation finally ended when Qatar engaged in mediation, which resulted in both 
armies withdrawing to their positions prior to the fighting and in the establishment 
of a buffer zone between the two states monitored by Qatari soldiers. The relations 
between the two states have remained cold.
The Eritrea-Ethiopia war also affected Somalia, which had been without effective 
central government since the fall of Siad Barre regime in 1991. Eritrea’s relationship 
with Egypt and Yemen improved since both had sought to weaken Ethiopia’s power 
in the sub-region, and these states appeared to lend active support to Eritrea to 
arm and train the Ethiopian separatist Oromo Liberation Front (OLF)33 based in 
Somalia under protection of warlord Mohamed Farah Aideed. Ogaden National 
Liberation Front (ONLF) in eastern Ethiopia also received assistance from Eritrea-
linked armed groups in Somalia and intensified its activities.34 Other smaller armed 
opposition groups were active in Ethiopia as well. In response, Addis Ababa supplied 
arms and training to armed groups in south-central Somalia, such as Rahenweyne 
Resistance Army and Puntland militia.35 Ethiopia also rejuvenated its relations with 
Sudan, seeking to relieve concerns on the Millennium Dam (currently known as 
The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam) on the Blue Nile, and engaging in economic 
cooperation, which contributed to Khartoum’s interest in supporting the Eritrean 
revolutionary armed opposition group, Eritrean Islamic Jihad, operating from the 
Sudanese territory. Finally, the Eritrea-Ethiopia conflict eased pressure on Sudan 
and permitted it to launch new military offensive against its main opponent, the 
Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army in Southern Sudan, while Yemen gained 
the upper hand over Eritrea in the Hanish Islands dispute.36   
In 2000, the Eritrean-Ethiopian war came to an end. Although Ethiopian military 
emerged victorious in terms of territorial gains, it had done so with a terrible cost 
due to direct loss of life, displacement of hundreds of thousands, and economic 
deterioration that included a famine which the Ethiopian government was accused 
of using strategically to weaken armed opposition in its Ogaden, Sidama, and parts 
of Oromia regions.37 The final Ethiopian military offensive in May 2000 had resulted 
in Eritrean withdrawal from approximately ¼ of its territory, and forced Asmara to 
come to the negotiation table in Algiers where a ceasefire agreement was signed in 
July ahead of the final peace treaty in December. According to the treaty, Eritrean-
Ethiopian Boundary Commission was established to demarcate the border, and PCA 
31 For instance, the Djiboutian government has accused Asmara of supporting Afar rebels in Djibouti 
and encouraging violence in the sub-region. See e.g. “Qatar to Deploy Troops to Djibouti and Eritrea”, 
Somalilandpress.com, 10 June 2010. Eritrean support for Ethiopian armed opposition and armed groups in 
Somalia has been widely documented.
32 On 10 June Eritrean forces initiated the fighting by firing on Djibouti units that rejected demands to return 
defected Eritrean soldiers. The fighting lasted for three days during which the Djibouti army received non-
lethal support mainly from France.
33 Ehteshami, Anoushiravan and Murphy, Emma C. (2011) The International Politics of the Red Sea (Abingdon: 
Routledge), p. 69.
34 Gilkes, Patrick (1999) “The Somali Connection”, BBC, 23 July.
35 Ibidem.
36 Ehteshami and Murphy, The International Politics of the Red Sea, p. 70.
37 Human Rights Watch (2001) World Report: Ethiopia – Human Rights Developments (New York, NY: Human 
Rights Watch).
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was put in charge to determine the boundary between the two states after the 
war. United Nations Mission to Eritrea and Ethiopia (UNMEE) was established to 
monitor the temporary security zone that extended 25 kilometers into Eritrean side 
of the border. Eventually PCA gave the disputed Badme area to Eritrea. Both parties 
initially agreed to the decision, but tension over the border continued.  
HOW ERITREA BECAME THE HORN OF AFRICA’S “ROGUE STATE”
The Eritrean-Ethiopian war changed the political climate in the sub-region. The 
sour relations continued, and reinforced the established practice of supporting the 
neighboring states’ armed and non-armed opposition groups particularly between 
Ethiopia and Eritrea. But more threatening for Eritrea, the major international 
powers and regional players, led by the United States, were aligning increasingly 
behind Ethiopia. In this situation, Eritrea sought to promote itself internationally 
and courted the United States, offering cooperation in the war on terror, access 
to its military installations, and pleaded for consideration of establishing American 
military base in Eritrea instead of Djibouti’s Camp Lemonnier. 
Yet, despite its efforts, Eritrea was unable to turn the wave of powerful states 
backing Ethiopia. It then adopted a confrontational approach and illegally occupied 
the demilitarized areas on its side of the Ethiopian border, which did not work in 
its favor in attracting external alliances among powerful states and international 
organizations that were aligning behind Ethiopia. In addition, despite the 
authoritarian TPLF-led political culture, Ethiopia attracted external investment. 
International businesses were increasingly interested in infrastructure projects, 
and exploiting its natural resources and agricultural potential. Eritrea, on the other 
hand, became largely considered as an aggressor in the war against Ethiopia and a 
troublemaker in the sub-region. The authoritarian nature of its regime had by now 
ended the naïve hopes in some quarters for Eritrea becoming a model democratic 
political system that would generate a wave of democratization in the sub-region.
The growing international isolation pushed Eritrean government to revert its focus 
back to internal politics to maintain the domestic status quo. Afewerki leadership 
had initially promised to hold elections in 1998, but these were first postponed 
to 2001 and then indefinitely in the context of confrontation with Ethiopia. In the 
aftermath of the defeat in the war, the government faced increasing criticism. This 
came mainly in the form of a letter signed by 15 prominent members of the PFDJ 
(G-15), which demanded the implementation of the suspended constitution, the 
opening up of political space for democratization, and accountability and freedom 
of speech. Instead, however, in September 2001 President Afewerki ordered a 
crack-down of within-the-regime critics who either disappeared or were imprisoned 
in the course of the following months. Many were detained without charges. The 
following year, Christian leaders and congregations were increasingly targeted, 
and the continuation of arbitrary arrests created an atmosphere of terror. This 
campaign orchestrated from the highest leadership concentrated power further to 
a diminishing circle of trusted individuals around President Afewerki.38 
38 See Connell, “Countries at the Crossroads”, pp. 1-4.
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Largely owing to the lack of reliable external alliances, confrontation with Ethiopia 
continued paramount in guiding Eritrea’s internal politics and foreign relations. 
By December 2005 tensions between Eritrea and Ethiopia had again built up 
as part of the competition for influence in the sub-region. This resulted from 
Eritrea’s disillusionment of the powerful states and international and (sub)regional 
organizations, namely the UN, the African Union (AU), and Inter-Governmental 
Authority on Development (IGAD), which all appeared favoring Ethiopia. Eritrea 
imposed increasing restrictions on UN operations in the border region with 
Ethiopia, and contested the PCA decision that condemned it for having attacked 
Ethiopia and broken international law. Subsequently Eritrea expelled aid workers, 
which contributed to remilitarization of the border and an escalation that was 
feared to lead to resumption of war between the two states. However, rather than 
aiming at new war which it could not afford, Eritrean government used the border 
dispute in which Ethiopia was allegedly occupying territory belonging to Eritrea to 
maintain state of emergency at home. This in turn justified upholding authoritarian 
rule, the continued suspension of the constitution, the postponing of elections, and 
mass recruitment to the National Service.39 At the same time, Eritrea played a key 
mediation role in Sudan’s Eastern Peace Agreement that aimed at ending armed 
insurrection in Eastern Sudan following the Comprehensive Peace Agreement 
between the Government of Sudan and the SPLM/A. This paved way for a temporary 
improvement of Eritrea-Sudan relations, but these have since been tarnished by 
Sudan’s good relations with Ethiopia, namely Sudan allowing Eritrean opposition 
factions to operate in its territory and handing over Eritrean-supported Ethiopian 
armed opposition elements to Ethiopia.  
In 2006, the Eritrea-Ethiopia proxy confrontation intensified in the context of 
resurgence of political Islam in the Horn of Africa. Islamist forces were gaining 
ground in Somalia, and the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) defeated the American-
backed Alliance for Restoration of Peace and Counter-Terrorism and advanced to 
Mogadishu.40 This fed further antagonism between Eritrea and the United States 
because Eritrea was seen as responsible for assisting militias, including those widely 
considered as terrorist organizations such as al-Qaeda. By seemingly destabilizing 
Somalia, Eritrea was considered to be working against Western and Ethiopian 
interests, and against regional peace and stability.
At the same time, Ethiopia continued experiencing armed opposition in its 
peripheries. It feared that the situation in Somalia, and Eritrean assistance to the 
ICU, ONLF, and OLF, would strengthen rebellions at home, mainly in its eastern and 
southern regions. In this situation, the United States encouraged Ethiopia to attack 
ICU in Somalia in order to boost the Western and Ethiopian-backed Transitional 
Federal Government (TFG), which had been established in April 2004 and only 
maintained limited influence around Baidoa. As a result, following TFG’s invitation 
to intervene, Ethiopia, backed by a small United States military contingent, invaded 
Somalia in July 2006 , which led to increasing ONLF activity and that brought about 
an extremely violent counterinsurgency campaign by the Ethiopian security forces 
in the Ogaden area of its Somali Region. Meanwhile, Ethiopia lent heavy support to 
39 Human Rights Watch (2009) Service for Life: State Repression and Indefinite Conscription in Eritrea (London: 
Human Rights Watch), p. 20.
40 Turse, Nick (2015) Tomorrow’s Battlefield: US Proxy Wars and Secret Ops in Africa (Chicago: Haymarket Books), 
p. 126.
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TFG and related groups, and Yemen sent arms to Somalia despite the UN embargo 
in place since 1992.41
Ethiopia’s intervention in Somalia was approved by the sub-regional organization, 
IGAD, based in Djibouti. Eritrea contested the IGAD’s decision which it claimed 
contravened international law, and suspended its IGAD membership in April 2007. 
Although TFG controlled limited territory in Somalia at the time and its legitimacy 
to invite Ethiopia to intervene can be questioned, the UN and AU were complicit. 
Eventually the Ethiopian and TFG forces prevailed, which forced ICU to splinter and 
laid basis for the strengthening of its armed Islamist militant faction, al-Shabaab. 
Following the collapse of the ICU in Mogadishu, and the forging of a power-sharing 
deal between TFG and an Islamist splinter group Alliance for the Re-liberation of 
Somalia (ARS), Ethiopia stated it would withdraw from Somalia in January 2009. 
Meanwhile, in April 2008, the ARS split and its second faction based in Asmara 
continued to receive money, arms, and training from Eritrea. 
In July 2008 UNMEE mandate ended at the Eritrea-Ethiopia border. Following this, 
pressure on Eritrea increased with the expectation of Ethiopian withdrawal from 
Somalia which was feared to leave more space for armed opposition groups that 
were working against Western and Ethiopian interests. Therefore, with respect to 
the situation in Somalia, international community assumed a position according 
to the posture of its most powerful states. On 23 December 2009, United Nations 
Security Council passed Resolution 1907 which singled out Eritrea’s actions 
in Somalia and in the border dispute with Djibouti as constituting “a threat to 
international peace and security”.42 Although Eritrea’s support of armed groups in 
Somalia was principally motivated by an attempt to counter Ethiopian domination 
of the sub-region, internationally powerful states and governmental and non-
governmental organizations siding with Ethiopia pushed for increasing international 
condemnation. Meticulous UN investigations specifically on Eritrea’s involvement 
were conducted, although a number of other external actors were also involved 
in subversive activities in Somalia. Amply endorsed by Ethiopian (and American) 
intelligence, the investigations detailed Eritrean support to the Ethiopian armed 
opposition groups (which the Ethiopian government has designated as terrorist 
organizations) and other militant groups in Somalia. Although recognizing activities 
of other states also affecting the security situation in Somalia, but not emphasizing 
for instance Ethiopia’s heavy support to the TFG that commanded little legitimacy, 
the investigations targeted particularly Eritrea. No similar inquiry was conducted on 
Ethiopian, or other states’, support of Eritrean opposition. Yet, the investigations 
resulted in a UN embargo on arms and similar materiel, which prohibited Eritrea 
from supporting “armed opposition groups which aim to destabilize the region, as 
well as harbouring, financing, facilitating, supporting, organizing, training or inciting 
individuals or groups to perpetrate acts of violence or terrorist acts against other 
States or their citizens in the region”.43 A number of Eritrean leaders were also 
subjected to travel bans and asset freezes.
As the tension between Eritrea and Ethiopia continued, the view of Eritrea as a 
41 UN Security Council (2008) Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 
1811 (2008), S/2008/769, 10 December, pp. 24-26.
42 United Nations Security Council (2009) Resolution 1907, 23 December, p. 2.
43 Ibid., p. 5.
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sub-regional spoiler of peace prevailed. Despite this, following Ethiopia’s partial 
withdrawal from Somalia, Eritrea stated its return to IGAD in July 2011. Its protest 
of the IGAD-endorsed Ethiopian intervention in Somalia appeared to be over. The 
move was seen as an attempt to avoid further sanctions amidst of accusations of 
plotting to bomb African Union summit in Addis Ababa and continuing to assist al-
Shabaab.44 Eritrea’s statement came ahead of United Nations Monitoring Group on 
Somalia and Eritrea report released on 13 July 2012, which indicated that Eritrea 
continued to support OLF and ONLF by deploying their elements through Somalia in 
an attempt to destabilize Ethiopia but at the same time having seized its assistance 
to al-Shabaab.45 This indicates that already by 2012 Eritrea had ended its support to 
the widely considered Islamist terrorist organization, which has largely been used 
to portray Eritrea as a rogue state. 
Eritrean motivation to end its support for al-Shabaab had to do with Asmara’s attempt 
to improve its international image. Yet, despite Eritrea’s apparent conciliatory 
moves, Western powers have continued to promote antagonism against it. Headed 
by the United States, they have persistently endorsed the confrontational stand 
against Eritrea by their sub-regional partners Ethiopia and Djibouti, while Sudan 
has sought a balance between improving its relationship with Ethiopia and United 
States and maintaining good ties with Eritrea. 
Meanwhile, United States has continued to consider Ethiopia as the core of 
its strategy in the Horn of Africa. Following the 2005 elections and during the 
intervention in Somalia, increasing focus was put on authoritarianism and human 
rights violations in Ethiopia. This contributed to the 2007 bill by the United States 
House of Representatives to condition American military aid to the country, but the 
initiative was eventually rejected.46 Washington continues to rely on Addis Ababa as 
its main ally in promoting its interests in the sub-region, countering terrorism and 
contributing to international peacekeeping operations,47 while operating from and 
providing military aid48 to Ethiopia. At the same time American geo-political strategy 
has given Djibouti an important role, as it hosts the principal base for United States 
military operations in Africa and provides Ethiopia the much-needed sea access.
Finally, the highly unstable Somalia has continued to serve as the main venue for 
violently clashing interests in the Horn of Africa. However, despite having been 
condemned for allegedly supporting armed groups in Somalia, Eritrea has not 
been the only state assisting armed factions or ostensibly engaging in destabilizing 
activities there. For instance, elements of the African Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), 
active since February 2007, have been accused of undermining peace and stability. 
The Kenyan AMISOM contingent, which originally entered Somalia in October 
2011, has reportedly engaged in dealings with al-Shabaab that have significantly 
contributed in the latter’s financial viability.49 Moreover, Ethiopia, which has 
44 - (2011) “Eritrea Seeks to Rejoin East African Body Igad”, British Broadcasting Corporation, 2 August.
45 See e.g. Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 2002 
(2011).
46 Jopson, Barney and Dombey, Daniel (2007) “Ethiopia Bill Faces Bush Backlash”, Financial Times, 3 October; and 
Ethiopia Democracy and Accountability Act of 2007, 110th United States Congress, 3 October.
47 US Department of State, Congressional Budget Justification, Foreign Operations, Fiscal Year 2010, Book II, p. 52.
48 Wezeman, Pieter D. (2010) “Arms Flows and the Conflict in Somalia“, Background Paper, Stockholm 
International Peace Research Institute, October, p. 8.
49 Journalists for Justice (2015) “Black and White: Kenya’s Criminal Racket in Somalia”, Nairobi, November.  
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gradually developed domestic arms industry,50 has reportedly provided weapons 
to various factions and has been repeatedly accused of promoting instability in 
Somalia to advance its hegemonic designs in the sub-region.51 In January 2014, 
Ethiopia overturned its earlier decision to withdraw from Somalia and formally 
joined AMISOM,52 while it has continued to heavily support confrontational, instead 
of reconciliatory, stand of Somali armed forces against some other Somali factions. 
These activities by AMISOM members contributing to instability have been taking 
place under the umbrella provided by the internationally funded peacekeeping 
mission. Still, no international investigation has been conducted on the specific 
activities of the AMISOM participants and other interveners in Somalia, while 
Eritrea has been singled out for its actions to promote alternative political order in 
the sub-region. 
ERITREA’S REGIONAL POLICY AND INTERNATIONAL PARTNERS TODAY
Eritrea’s confrontational stand with Ethiopia has shaped its foreign policy and is 
directly linked to its internal politics.53 President Afewerki and his narrowing 
leadership circle have remained in total control of formal and informal institutions. 
Maintaining this status quo and repressive rule has required the continuity of 
confrontation with Ethiopia. It has justified the curbing of opposition and the 
prevention of political opening that could lead to the unraveling of the highly 
centralized and narrowly based regime. The situation in the aftermath of the wave 
of repression in 2001, and the continuous conscription to the National Service, 
have fueled mass emigration. But the strategy to extract obligatory formal taxes 
and fees from the diaspora has been ailing, in part due to restrictions in the host 
countries, which has resulted in informal channels of extraction gaining relative 
importance. Some prominent regime individuals have reportedly been involved in 
arms trade and human trafficking through Sudan, and funds have been collected 
through diaspora cultural events. The regime has also stepped up gold mining 
and other mineral extraction activities to acquire foreign exchange. As a result, 
despite the sanctions, until now the Eritrean state has been able to obtain sufficient 
financial assets and military equipment to ensure the survival of the regime that is 
accustomed to governing with scarce resources. Still, however, the regime has been 
pressed to find external sources of funding and other resources for sustaining itself. 
Consequently, Asmara’s isolation and meager economic situation has necessitated 
a search for new external alliances. In this regard, the process of lifting sanctions 
on Iran and normalization of its international status, and a recent grudge between 
United Arab Emirates and Djibouti, have given Eritrea the opportunity to gain 
much-needed external support by embracing the Gulf States threatened by the 
strengthened Iran. Up until recently, Asmara had allied itself with Iran and had been 
50 - (2009) “Ethiopia to Boost Arms Production: PM“, Nazret.org, 14 April.
51 See e.g. Khayre, Ahmed Ali M. (2014) “Can Ethiopian AMISOM Troops Be a Neutral Force?”, International Policy 
Digest, 2 July; and Arman, Abukar (2015) “Somalia’s New Race Against Time”, Foreign Policy Association, 5 
January. Ethiopia has imported arms from a number of foreign sources, and recently its acquisition of material 
apt for manufacturing nuclear weapons from the United Kingdom became a source of concern in some circles. 
See Duffy, Judith (2015) “Concerns Raised over UK Export of Nuclear Weapon ‘Ingredient’ to Ethiopia”, Herald 
Scotland, 1 November.
52 - (2014) “Ethiopian Troops Formally Join AMISOM Peacekeepers in Somalia”, AMISOM, January.
53 Arguably, internal politics in Ethiopia also feed from the confrontation.
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complacent of Iran’s support of the Shiite Houthi rebels in the neighboring Yemen. 
However, the lifting of sanctions on Iran have reinforced its position in the Middle 
East substantially, which threatens the position of Saudi Arabia and the smaller Gulf 
States aligned with it (especially Bahrain, Kuwait, United Arab Emirates, and Qatar). 
As a result, the confrontation between Saudi Arabia and Iran has heightened, and 
Asmara has come to the realization that shifting from the long-term alliance with 
Iran to the Saudi-led camp of Gulf States is more beneficial in terms of obtaining 
badly needed financial and economic resources from abroad. On the other hand, 
the Gulf States have been eager to find allies on the African side of the Red Sea to 
support their campaign in Yemen, especially after the severing of relations between 
United Arab Emirates and Djibouti. 
Thus the war in Yemen, and particularly the Saudi-led coalition’s intervention since 
2015, has given Asmara an opportunity to shift foreign policy orientation and 
cement cooperation with its new allies. Eritrea has allowed United Arab Emirates 
and Saudi Arabia to use its ports and airport for anti-Houthi campaign in Yemen,54 
sent a significant military contingent that has been incorporated into United Arab 
Emirates units in support of the Saudi-led coalition, and has gained much-needed 
economic assistance, rehabilitation of infrastructure, and diplomatic support in 
return.55 This could possibly lead to moderate improvement of Eritrea’s relations 
with the United States in the long term, although it is unlikely to happen as long 
as it continues to confront Ethiopia. Meanwhile, the Ethiopian-supported Eritrean 
opposition has continued to allege that Eritrea’s decision to assist the Saudi-led 
coalition in the war in Yemen has allowed it to gain financial and economic means 
against the Security Council resolutions, and that these resources will be used to 
maintain power and domestic repression as well as to destabilize the sub-region.56 
At the same time, Eritrea-Ethiopia relations have remained tense. A number of 
incidents, such as cross-border skirmishes and bombardment, have taken place, 
and both parties continue to support each other’s armed opposition groups.57 The 
tensions increased further ahead of Ethiopian 2015 elections, when an alleged 
Ethiopian air raid destroyed a military depot and a gold mine processing facility near 
Asmara, the latter of which having been considered to provide a major source of 
revenue for the Eritrean regime.58 Eritrea has also accused Ethiopia of preparing for 
an invasion.59 On the other hand, Ethiopian leadership has found the improvement 
of relations between Eritrea and the Gulf States as a source of concern, especially if 
they result in an attempt to destabilize the Ethiopian state.60
54 Fitzgerald, Dennis (2015) “UN Report: UAE, Saudi Using Eritrean Land, Sea, Airspace and, Possibly, Eritrean 
Troops in Yemen Battle”, UN Tribune, 2 November.
55 Solomon, Salem (2016) “Observers See Several Motives for Eritrean Involvement in Yemen”, Voice of America, 
9 January.
56 Tekle, Tesfa-Alem (2016) “Eritrean rebels raid military base, kill intelligence agents”, Sudan Tribune, 29 January.
57 A number of armed opposition groups are active in both countries. In Eritrea, the strongest guerrilla 
opposition has been staged by the Eritrean National Salvation Front, while in Ethiopia the armed opposition 
organizations Ogaden National Liberation Front and Oromo Liberation Front continue to exist.
58 “Eritrea: Ethiopian Planes Raided Bisha Goldmine“, Asmarino Independent, 21 March 2015, and “Ethiopian 
Air Force Jets Attack Key Targets Inside Eritrea, High Ranking Military Officer Confirmed”, Awramba Times, 22 
March 2015.
59 “Eritrea Says Arch-Rival Ethiopia Has Increased War Rhetoric, and Is Threatening to Invade It”, Mail & Guardian 
Africa, 7 September 2015.
60 - (2015) “Hailemariam warns Saudi Arabia and UAE over military moves in and around Eritrea’s Assab port”, 
Awramba Times, 2 September.
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CONCLUSION
Eritrea is an authoritarian state in which political power crystallizes exclusively in 
the highest leadership, the Afewerki presidency. Although Eritrean political system, 
in principle, is composed of institutions that resemble democratic order, its political 
culture continues to be defined by the governing methods and strategies of the 
highly centralized military-political organization which led the final stage of the 
long and violent liberation struggle. Despite the early hopes for democratization, 
President Afewerki has maintained political power by limiting the state leadership 
to his person and a handful of trusted individuals in charge of the key military and 
political institutions. Still, the regime has been sufficiently strong to maintain the 
repressive political order and curb internal dissent with meager resources for years, 
which indicates that it has the capacity to continue doing so in the near future 
despite mass emigration and diaspora opposition. Yet, the reduction of the regime’s 
powerbase into a handful of trusted individuals may put into question the survival 
of the administration after Afewerki because he has no obvious successor.
At the international level, since the Eritrean-Ethiopian war, Eritrea has been 
increasingly considered a rogue state and a spoiler of peace in the Horn of Africa. 
However, due to its small size and limited resources, especially after facing 
sanctions, and its neighbors having secured the backing of internationally powerful 
states, Eritrea has little capacity to undermine the prevailing power relations in the 
sub-region. In addition, it is important to highlight that Eritrean foreign policy is 
not substantially different from the policies pursued by other states in the Horn 
of Africa. Its external relations aim at supporting the regime’s internal order and 
interests in the neighboring states, and this is hardly distinct from foreign policy 
strategies pursued by its neighbors. Eritrea’s continuing confrontation with Ethiopia 
draws from the regime’s attempt to maintain internal status quo and to resist 
Ethiopia’s domination of the sub-region. Ethiopia having become a major ally of 
principal Western powers, and exerting influence through the regional and sub-
regional organizations, the AU and the IGAD, has therefore pushed Eritrea in conflict 
with Western interests and in confrontation with most of its neighboring states. Its 
documented support of non-state actors that goes against the interests of the more 
powerful states in the sub-region, and their local, regional, and extra-regional allies, 
continues to put Eritrea in a vulnerable position. Eritrea’s confrontation with its 
direct neighbors, although less with Sudan, along with the domestic authoritarian 
and repressive political environment, hinders Asmara’s chances to improve its 
international image.    
Finally, despite the recently improving ties between Eritrea and the Gulf States, there 
are few prospects for Eritrea under the current leadership to escape its international 
image as a rogue state in the near future. This is because Afewerki regime’s politics 
have mainly sought to maintain domestic power by confrontational foreign policy 
aimed at promoting alternative political order in the Horn through assistance to 
non-state armed groups labeled as “terrorist”. Still, its methods have hardly differed 
from those employed by more powerful states in the sub-region, which also uphold 
poor domestic human rights records and use their regular armies, non-state armed 
groups, and diplomatic influence in international, regional, and sub-regional 
organizations to advance their interests in the Horn of Africa and beyond.
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